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Abstract
In this paper, we quantify the contribution of labor market reforms to unemployment
dynamics in nine OECD countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). We build and estimate a dynamic
stochastic search-matching model with heterogeneous workers, where aggregate shocks to
productivity fuel up the cycle, and unanticipated policy interventions shift structural pa-
rameters and displace the long-term equilibrium. We show that the heterogeneous-worker
mechanism proposed by Robin (2011) to explain unemployment volatility by productivity
shocks works well in all countries. The amount of resources injected into placement and
employment services, the reduction of UI benefits and product market deregulation stand
out as the most prominent policy levers for unemployment reduction. All other LMPs
have a significant but lesser impact. We also find that business cycle shocks and LMPs
explain about the same share of unemployment volatility (except for Japan, Portugal and
the US).
JEL classification: E24, E32, J21.
Keywords: Unemployment dynamics, turnover, labor market institutions, job search,
matching function.
1 Introduction
A large number of studies have sought the source of persistent diﬀerences in European and
American labor market outcomes in diﬀerent labor market institutions. Following Bruno
and Sachs (1985), research looked for the most eﬀective labor market policies by running
pooled cross-country time-series regressions of unemployment rates on various macroeco-
nomic indicators (like GDP growth) and a battery of labor market institutional indices
(see Nickell and Layard, 1999, for a survey). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola,
Blau and Khan (2007) thus showed that diﬀerent policy mixes induce diﬀerent responses of
unemployment to world-wide shocks (like an oil shock) and country-specific productivity
shocks; and Bassanini and Duval (2009) emphasized the existence of complementarities
between labor market policies. In parallel, in order to understand the mechanisms of these
interactions, research spawned a collection of small dynamic stochastic equilibrium mod-
els focussing on one particular labor market policy at a time. For example, the influential
work of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) emphasized the link between long-term unemploy-
ment and welfare policies, while Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2008) emphasized the role
of labor taxes.
In this paper we will try to incorporate the rich reduced forms of the former approach
into a small equilibrium model of the latter kind. The idea is to identify a small set of
parameters of the dynamic equilibrium model governing the responses to aggregate shocks
of unemployment and turnover, and channelling a wide range of labor market policies at
the same time. The number of policies simultaneously examined is potentially large,
yet the number of parameters through which they impact the economy should be kept
small for the model to be identified. Identification is indeed likely to fail if the number
of intervention channels is greater than the number of independent series used in the
analysis. Specifically, if we use series of unemployment stocks and flows, and vacancies,
as labor market variables, it will be diﬃcult to identify more than three separate channels
for policy intervention.1
1The change in unemployment is the diﬀerence between the inflow and the outflow. So stocks and
flows are not independent series.
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We develop a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with heterogeneous workers,
where aggregate shocks to productivity fuel up the cycle, and unanticipated policy in-
terventions displace the stationary stochastic equilibrium by shifting structural turnover
parameters. This model is estimated for nine diﬀerent countries (Australia, France, Ger-
many, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States), over
the period 1985-2007, in two ways. First, a version without policy interventions is esti-
mated on detrended series by the Simulated Method of Moments. Second, policy eﬀects
are introduced into the model, and estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals
for the series of actual unemployment rates (i.e. trend plus cycle), unemployment flows
and job vacancies.
The model builds on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, henceforth MP). Yet, it is im-
mune to Shimer’s (2005) critique. Shimer showed that in the MP model Nash bargaining
converts most of the cyclical volatility of aggregate productivity into wage volatility, leav-
ing little room for change to the key variable driving unemployment, market tightness.
In the same AER issue, Hall (2005) presented a calibration showing that the unemploy-
ment volatility puzzle could indeed be solved by wage rigidity.2 However, his argument
was recently contested by Pissarides (2009), who presented empirical evidence that the
volatility of wages in new jobs, those that proceed from new vacancies, is large compared
to the volatility of ongoing wages. Finally, Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) solution to
the puzzle does not require wage rigidity but assumes a very large value of non market
time (some 95% of productivity).
Our model extends the model of Robin (2011) by endogenizing labor demand through a
matching function and vacancy creation. It has two main ingredients that make it distinct
from the MP model, namely heterogenous worker abilities3 and a diﬀerent wage setting
mechanism. First, workers diﬀer in ability. In good states of the economy, all matches are
profitable and all workers are employable. In bad states, low-skill workers fail to generate
positive surplus and are thus laid oﬀ or stay unemployed longer. With a thick left tail
2See also Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009).
3In this simple version of the model, we abstract from firm heterogeneity in production. For an
extension of the model with heterogeneous firms, see Lise and Robin (2013).
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of the ability distribution, small adverse shocks to the economy lead a disproportionately
high number of low-skill workers into the negative surplus region and into unemployment.
We show that this amplification mechanism fits unemployment volatility well in all nine
major OECD countries used in the empirical analysis.
We also assume that wage contracts are long term contracts that can only be renego-
tiated by mutual agreement (see Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). Wage renegotiation is
either induced by on-the-job search and Bertrand competition between employers, or by
aggregate shocks big enough to threaten match disruption. As a consequence, wages in
new jobs are more volatile than ongoing wages.4 This assumption also simplifies the form
of the Bellman equation defining the surplus of a match with a worker of a given type in
a given state of the economy, and it thus makes the dynamic stochastic equilibrium very
easy to solve.
We use our model to assess the impact of labor market reforms on the actual (i.e.
not detrended) rate of unemployment by way of counterfactual simulations. We find that
placement services, unemployment benefits and product market regulation are the main
policy tools significantly influencing unemployment over the 1985-2007 period. These by
all means classical policies are accountable for close to one, or more than one percentage
point change in unemployment. The other policies yielded, on average, only between 20%
and a third of a percentage point. Specifically, Australia and France reduced (or prevented
a rise of) unemployment by increasing expenditure on placement services and deregulating
product markets. Germany deregulated. Spain massively reduced unemployment bene-
fits, deregulated and reduced employment protection. The UK reduced unemployment
benefit, improved placement services and deregulated. The only countries implementing
unemployment-augmenting policies are countries with low unemployment rates and hit by
a deep and long-lasting recession at the end of the eighties or the beginning of the nineties.
Thus, Japan and Sweden massively reduced ALMP expenditure. Lastly, Portugal and the
US made no noticeable classical policy intervention. We do not find evidence of policy
complementarity, as the sum of individual eﬀects is similar in value to the Diﬀerence-in-
4Hall and Krueger (2012) emphasize the empirical relevance of on-the-job search to explain wage
formation.
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Diﬀerence eﬀect of the policy mix. Finally, we measure the relative contribution of LMPs
and business cycle shocks to the long term variance of unemployment. In general, both
contribute to about half of the total variance, with some exceptions: in Japan, business
cycle shocks do not explain much unemployment volatility, and in Portugal and the US
labor market policies seem to have little impact.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a dynamic sequential-auction model
with heterogeneous workers and identical firms is developed. Section 3 describes the data
and Section 4 the estimation procedure. In Section 5, the business cycle version of the
model is estimated on nine OECD countries. In Section 6, labor market policy eﬀects are
estimated. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N. The global state of the economy is an ergodic
Markov chain yt ∈ {y1 < ... < yN} with transition matrix Π = (πij). We use yt to denote
the random variable and yi or yj to denote one of the N possible realizations. There are
M types of workers and ℓm workers of each type, with ℓ1 + ...+ ℓM = 1. Workers of type
m have ability xm and xm < xm+1. All firms are identical. Workers and firm are paired
into productive units. The per-period output of a worker of ability xm when aggregate
productivity is yi is denoted as yi(m).
2.1 Turnover and unemployment
Matches form and break at the beginning of each period. Let ut(m) denote the proportion
of unemployed in the population of workers of ability xm at the end of period t − 1, or
at the beginning of period t, just before revelation of the aggregate shock for period t,
and let ut = ut(1)ℓ1 + ...+ ut(M)ℓM define the aggregate unemployment rate. Let St(m)
denote the surplus of a match with a worker of type xm at time t, that is, the present
value of the match minus the value of unemployment and minus the value of a vacancy
(assumed to be nil). Only matches with positive surplus St(m) ≥ 0 are viable.
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At the beginning of period t, yt is realized and a new value St(m) is observed for
the match surplus. An endogenous fraction 1{St(m) < 0}[1 − ut(m)]ℓm of employed
workers is immediately laid oﬀ if the match surplus becomes negative, and another fraction
δ1{St(m) ≥ 0}[1− ut(m)]ℓm is otherwise destroyed. In addition, a fraction λt1{St(m) ≥
0}ut(m)ℓm of employable unemployed workers meet with a vacancy. Finally, we also allow
employees to meet with alternative employers, and move or negotiate wage increases (more
on this later).
Aggregate shocks thus determine unemployment by conditioning job destruction and
the duration of unemployment. The law of motion for individual-specific unemployment
rates is ut+1(m) = 1 if St(m) < 0, and
ut+1(m) = ut(m) + δ(1− ut(m))− λtut(m),
if St(m) ≥ 0. The dynamics of unemployment by worker type depends on the dynamics
of the whole match surplus, not on how the surplus is split between the employer and the
worker.
Define the exit rate from unemployment (or job finding rate) as the product of the
meeting rate and the share of employable unemployed workers,
ft = λt
∑
m ut(m)ℓm1{St(m) ≥ 0}
ut
. (1)
Define also the job destruction rate as the sum of the exogenous and the endogenous layoﬀ
rates,
st = δ + (1− δ)
∑
m(1− ut(m))ℓm1{St(m) < 0}
1− ut
. (2)
Aggregate unemployment then satisfies the usual recursion:
ut+1 = ut + st(1− ut)− ftut.
It is important to stress here that both the job finding rate ft and the job destruction rate
st mix structural parameters (in λt and δ) with endogenous variables: the share of employ-
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able unemployed workers (
∑
m
1{St(m)≥0}ut(m)ℓm
ut
) and the share of unemployable employed
workers (
∑
m
1{St(m)<0}(1−ut(m))ℓm
1−ut
). For that reason, standard least-squares estimates of
matching functions or layoﬀ rates will not provide consistent estimators.
2.2 Rent sharing
We assume that employers have full monopsony power with respect to unemployed work-
ers. They keep the whole surplus in this case and unemployed workers leave unemployment
with a wage that is only marginally greater than their reservation wage. The assump-
tion that unemployed workers have zero bargaining power relative to employers is mainly
technical: it makes the dynamics of unemployment independent of wages. As the focus
of this paper is on unemployment dynamics and worker flows, we believe that this decou-
pling is justified. Note however that we could easily allow for Nash bargaining between
unemployed workers and firms, but this would complicate the model a lot for a marginal
gain.
Employed workers search on the job. When the search for an alternative employer is
successful, we assume that Bertrand competition between the incumbent and the poacher
transfers the entire surplus to the worker. The worker is indiﬀerent between staying or
moving. We assume that job-to-job mobility is then decided by coin tossing. Employer
heterogeneity would eliminate this indeterminacy, at the cost of great additional complex-
ity (see Lise and Robin, 2013, for an extension of this model with two-sided heterogeneity).
2.3 Vacancy creation and market tightness
Firms post vacancies vt until ex ante profits are exhausted. The total vacancy cost is cvt.
Vacancies can either randomly meet with an unemployed worker or with an employed
worker. However, only the meetings with unemployed workers generate a profit to the
firm. Free entry then ensures that
cvt = λt
M∑
m=1
ut(m)ℓmSt(m)
+, (3)
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where we denote x+ = max(x, 0).
Define market tightness as the ratio of vacancies and workers’ aggregate search inten-
sity,
θt =
vt
ut + k(1− ut)
, (4)
where k is the relative search intensity of employees with respect to unemployed.5 The
meeting rate λt is related to market tightness via the meeting function, λt = f(θt), where
f is an increasing function, likely concave.
2.4 The value of unemployment and the match surplus
Let Ui(m) denote the present value of remaining unemployed for the rest of period t for
a worker of type m if the economy is in state i. It solves the following linear Bellman
equation:
Ui(m) = zi(m) +
1
1 + r
∑
j
πijUj(m). (5)
This equation can be understood as follows. An unemployed worker receives a flow-
payment zi(m) for the period. At the beginning of the next period, the state of the
economy changes to yj with probability πij and the worker receives a job oﬀer with some
probability. We have assumed that employers oﬀer unemployed workers their reservation
wage on a take-it-or-leave basis, thus eﬀectively reaping the whole surplus. As a conse-
quence, the present value of a new job to the worker is only marginally better than the
value of unemployment. Hence, the continuation value is the value of unemployment in
the new state j whether the workers remains unemployed or not.
Let us now turn to the match surplus. After a productivity shock from i to j all
matches yielding negative surplus are destroyed. Then, either on-the-job search is un-
successful, and the match surplus only changes because the macroeconomic environment
changes; or the worker is poached and Bertrand competition gives the whole match sur-
plus to the worker, whether she moves or not. As everything that the worker expects to
earn in the future contributes to the definition of the current surplus, the surplus of a
5We use k = 0.12 as in Robin (2011) but imposing a zero search intensity for employees has little
influence on the estimation outcome.
7
match with a worker of type m when the economy is in state i thus solves the following
(almost linear) Bellman equation:
Si(m) = yi(m)− zi(m) +
1− δ
1 + r
∑
j
πijSj(m)
+. (6)
This almost-linear system of equations can be solved numerically by value function itera-
tion. As for the unemployment value, the match surplus only depends on the state of the
economy.
2.5 Parameterization and functional forms
Unemployment exit rate and the matching function. The meeting rate, and
hence the unemployment exit rate, are related to market tightness θt via a Cobb-Douglas
matching technology:
λt = f(θ) = φθ
η. (7)
A standard cross-country OLS regression of job finding rates on tightness (in logs) simply
defined as v/u delivers estimates of matching eﬃciency φ = 0.712 and matching elasticity
η = 0.289, in tune with the empirical literature (Murtin and de Serres, 2014).
Aggregate shocks. We assume that aggregate productivity follows a Gaussian AR(1)
process:
ln yt = ρ ln yt−1 + σεt, (8)
where innovations are iid-normal N(0, 1). Note that the aggregate productivity shock yt
is a latent process that does not a priori coincide with observed output or output per
worker. Indeed, observed output is the aggregation of match output yt(m) across all
active matches, say
Yt =
∑
m
[1− ut(m)] ℓm yt(m), (9)
and is thus endogenous. Therefore, the structural parameters (ρ, σ) cannot be directly
inferred from the observed series of aggregate output.
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We discretize the aggregate productivity process yt as follows. Let F denote the
estimated equilibrium distribution of yt.6 The joint distribution of two consecutive ranks
F (yt) and F (yt+1) is a copula C (i.e. the CDF of the distribution of two random variables
with uniform margins). To discretize the aggregate productivity processes we first specify
a grid a1 < ... < aN on [ϵ, 1−ϵ] ⊂ (0, 1) of N linearly spaced points including end points ϵ
and 1−ϵ. Then we set yi = F−1(ai) and πij ∝ c(ai; aj), where c denotes the copula density
and we impose the normalization
∑
j πij = 1. In practice, we use N = 150, ϵ = 0, 002;
F is a log-normal CDF and c is a Gaussian copula density, as implied by the Gaussian
AR(1) specification.
Worker heterogeneity. Match productivity is specified as yi(m) = yixm, where (xm, m =
1, ...,M) is a grid of M linearly spaced points on the interval [C,C + 1]. The choice of
the support does not matter much provided that it is large enough and contains one. A
beta distribution is assumed for the ability distribution, namely
ℓm ∝ betapdf (xm, ν, µ) , (10)
with the normalization
∑
m ℓm = 1. The beta distribution allows for a variety of shapes
for the density (increasing, decreasing, non monotone, concave or convex). We use a very
dense grid of M = 500 points to guarantee a good resolution in the left tail.
Leisure and vacancy costs. The opportunity cost of employment zi(m) (aggregating
the utility of leisure, unemployment insurance and welfare) is specified as a constant z.
Labor market institutions. Because of the feed-back eﬀects implied by the model, it
is important for identification that we restrict the channels of policy interventions. For
example, any policy that directly impacts matching eﬃciency (φ) immediately changes
the meeting rate (λt) and, subsequently, the number of created vacancies (vt) via the
free entry condition. Both eﬀects contribute to changing the job finding rate (ft). If one
makes the cost of posting a vacancy (c) a concurrent intervention channel for this policy,
6That is, with white-noise innovations, ln yt ∼ N
(
0, σ
2
1−ρ2
)
.
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then the policy aﬀects vacancy creation in two ways, which evidently reduces the chances
that the model be identified.
Because we only have independent data information on turnover flows (ft and st) and
vacancies (vt) we decided to introduce labor market policies (henceforth LMPs) through
only three structural parameters: matching eﬃciency (φ) via equation (1), the job de-
struction rate (δ) via equation (2), and the cost of posting a vacancy (c) via equation
(3). Formally, we let parameters φ, δ and c in country n at time t be log-linear indices of
country-specific institutional variables X1nt, ..., X
K
nt:
φnt = φ
0
n exp
(∑
k
φk•X
k
nt
)
, δnt = δ
0
n exp
(∑
k
δk•X
k
nt
)
, cnt = c
0
n exp
(∑
k
ck•X
k
nt
)
.
In these equations, the LMP semi-elasticities (φk•, δ
k
• , c
k
1•) are common to all countries.
However, intercepts (φ0n, δ
0
n, c
0
n) are country-specific. This framework thus identifies insti-
tutional eﬀects from policy variations.
3 The data
We have assembled data on labor market outcomes and institutions for nine OECD coun-
tries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and
Unites States, over the period 1985-2007. These data and their sources are described in
detail in Appendix A.
3.1 Unemployment and turnover cycle
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the rate of unemployment as well as the probabil-
ity of entering and exiting unemployment. All series are quarterly. The trend and cyclical
components were extracted by HP-filtering the log-transformed series with a smoothing
parameter equal to 105, as in Shimer (2005), and re-exponentiating. The volatility of
unemployment and of turnover are very diﬀerent across countries. Japan displays lower
and less volatile unemployment, due to lower job destruction rates, than any other coun-
try. The US exhibit more turnover and higher exit rates from unemployment. France,
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Table 1: Unemployment and Turnover Cycle - Descriptive Statistics
Period Unemployment Job Destruction Rate Job Finding Rate
mean std std mean std mean std
trend cycle trend cycle trend cycle
Australia 1979Q1-2009Q4 5.69 2.62 1.19 1.10 3.78 0.36 0.23 47.74 6.62 5.69
Germany 1984Q1-2010Q1 6.09 2.72 1.27 1.06 1.81 0.06 0.52 18.71 0.88 2.71
Spain 1978Q1-2010Q2 12.76 4.10 1.94 2.78 3.88 0.73 0.16 21.67 8.04 5.55
France 1976Q1-2010Q1 6.18 3.33 1.58 0.77 2.41 0.43 0.16 22.59 3.64 2.78
UK 1967Q2-2010Q1 6.25 2.74 1.86 1.29 3.06 0.48 0.60 43.87 15.22 5.35
Japan 1978Q1-2007Q4 2.65 1.31 0.92 0.49 1.51 0.27 0.22 42.78 4.21 4.83
Portugal 1987Q1-2010Q2 5.70 2.29 0.84 1.22 1.45 0.20 0.42 20.58 0.99 3.55
Sweden 1972Q1-2010Q1 4.81 3.03 2.20 1.85 2.84 0.75 0.27 56.06 10.14 6.31
US 1960Q1-2010Q2 5.95 1.54 0.75 1.14 4.82 0.68 0.66 76.59 6.03 5.21
Notes: All figures are in percent. Series were detrended using the HP-filter with smoothing parameter
105.
and Japan to a lesser extent, display particularly low cyclical volatility in unemployment
turnover.
Interesting patterns emerge from trends (Figure 1). Unemployment culminates in the
1980s in the UK and the US, and in the 1990s in Australia, France, Spain and Sweden.
Japan displays a monotonic, increasing trend throughout the 1960-2010 period. Unem-
ployment rebounds in the early 2000s in Portugal and the US. Long-term unemployment
trends hide strikingly diﬀerent trends in turnover rates. Job destruction rates tend to
increase in France, Japan, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and to decrease in Australia,
the UK and the US since the mid-1980s. Job-finding rates tend to increase in Australia,
France and Spain, and to decrease in Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US. These pat-
terns are potentially associated with important labor market reforms that we now briefly
discuss.
3.2 Labor market policies
The set of labor market policy variables used as potential determinants of unemployment
stocks and flows in the empirical analysis are the following: i) the replacement rate used
to calculate unemployment insurance (UI) benefits at first date of reception; ii) public ex-
penditure on active labor market policies per unemployed worker (ALMPs) normalized by
11
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate and Turnover - Trends and Cycles
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Table 2: Labor Market Institutions - Correlated Change in 1985-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Initial Replacement Rate 1.000
(2) ALMP: Placement -0.042 1.000
(3) ALMP: Training 0.568 0.488 1.000
(4) ALMP: Incentives 0.557 0.572 0.944 1.000
(5) Product Market Regulation 0.224 0.046 0.409 0.303 1.000
(6) Employment Protection 0.196 0.067 -0.077 -0.049 0.170 1.000
(7) Tax Wedge 0.047 -0.451 -0.356 -0.391 -0.393 0.037 1.000
Note: Correlations of deviations of LMPs from country-specific means.
GDP per worker, and broken down into three sub-categories (placement and employment
services, employment incentives7 and training); iii) the OECD index of product market
regulation; iv) the OECD index of employment protection for regular contracts; v) the
tax wedge (personal income tax plus payroll taxes and social security contributions). We
exclude from the analysis LMPs such as the legal minimum wage, union density and other
wage bargaining institutions as they mostly aﬀect wages, which are outside the scope of
this paper.
Figure 2 plots the LMP series for all countries between 1985 and 2007 (the period over
which we have gathered a balanced sample of labor market outcomes). Some institutions
show no change in the period (such as employment protection in the US). The associated
policy eﬀects cannot be identified in this case. However, in general, LMPs do vary over
time and across countries.
France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden oﬀer high support to the unemployed and high
employment protection at the same time, whereas the US, the UK, Australia and Canada
are on the low side, and Germany and Japan somewhere in-between. Sweden stands
alone in its eﬀort to reduce ALMP spendings. It started the period from a very high
point, considerably more interventionist than any other country, and converged to a more
comparable norm. Japan and Sweden used to spend a lot more than the other countries on
placement and labor services. They tend to be overtaken by Great Britain and Australia,
7These expenditures include incentives to private employment, direct job creation, job sharing and
start-up incentives.
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Figure 2: Labor Market Institutions - 1985-2007
14
and France to a lesser extent; the UK spending more (per unit of labor productivity) in
2007 than Sweden. Product market regulation shows a remarkable convergence toward
deregulation in all countries, with Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Spain and Sweden
progressively becoming more deregulated than the US. There is some tendency to converge
toward a more common model of employment protection among European states, with
Portugal and Spain (particularly) reducing EPL and the UK and Australia increasing
EPL (a bit). There are some variations in labor taxes over time and across countries, but
they consistently remain higher in Sweden, France and Germany.
Table 2 displays the correlations between the LMP variables centered around their
country-specific means. The three ALMP components are strongly correlated, in particu-
lar training and firm incentives. Interestingly, product market deregulation or unemploy-
ment insurance reductions are often accompanied by another policy, such as increased
expenditure on training or employment incentives or wage subsidies, aiming at reducing
social or economic collateral costs. This is much less the case for employment protection
which appears much less correlated with other LMPs.
3.3 Intervention mechanisms
As already emphasized, it is important for identification to restrict the channels of policy
interventions. Heuristically, in absence of a more formal model of the mechanisms of
policy interventions, we ended up restricting the mapping between LMPs and structural
parameters in the following way.
A first set of policies aﬀect the search-matching technology. More generous unemploy-
ment benefits should reduce unemployed workers’ search intensity. More placement and
employment services should help unemployed workers find jobs more easily and improve
match quality. Higher quality matches should in turn be more resilient to exogenous de-
struction shocks. More training provided to unemployed workers should also raise match
quality and reduce job destruction. The impact of training on job finding rates is yet
ambiguous and possibly negative, as the participation to training programs may also
increase the duration of unemployment. Therefore, we allow the replacement rate, the
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indices for placement and employment services, and training to determine parameters φ
and δ (matching eﬃciency and exogenous job destruction).
Employment incentives (like payroll tax discounts), product market regulation, and
employment protection to some extent, are another group of policies that operate through
similar mechanisms: they primarily aﬀect job creation and job destruction. Employment
incentives encourage vacancy creation, but they also make employers less picky and thus
facilitate the creation of matches of lower quality, which therefore terminate sooner than
later. Less product market regulation fosters competition between firms, which is favor-
able to employment in a way that can be captured in our model by a reduction in the
vacancy cost. At the same time, more competition between firms reduces profit margins
and increases the probability of failure, and thus generates more job destruction. Employ-
ment protection renders separation more costly; it delays job destruction but firms are
also more reluctant to post vacancies. These policies have no obvious impact on match-
ing eﬃciency. Hence, we allow employment incentives, employment protection, product
market regulation and the tax wedge to determine parameters c and δ (cost of vacancy
and exogenous job destruction).
The set of labor market policies is complemented by a handful of socio-demographic
variables, namely the shares of workers aged 15-24 and 55-64 in the 15-64 population, and
mean years of higher education among the 15-64 population. Indeed there is empirical
evidence (e.g. Murtin and de Serres, 2014) that both unemployment entry and exit rates
decline with age. These socio-demographic variables are assumed to have an impact on
turnover parameters φ and δ.
4 Estimation procedure
The estimation is conducted in two steps. In the first step, we estimate a stationary version
of the model that fits the cyclical components of the series of GDP, unemployment, job
finding and job destruction rates, and vacancies separately for the nine OECD countries.
This will us us to test the ability of the heterogeneous-worker search-matching model to fit
unemployment volatility well in all countries. In the second step, we introduce LMPs into
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the empirical framework and we estimate their impact on the structural parameters φ, δ
and c by fitting the raw series (non detrended) of unemployment, turnover and vacancies
jointly for all nine countries.
4.1 Assessing business-cycle dynamics
The estimation of the parameters controlling the short-term response of the economy to
business cycle shocks closely follows the method in Robin (2011). We assume that HP-
filtered series follow the model of this paper as in a stationary environment exempt from
any institutional change. Hence, we impose φk• = δ
k
• = c
k
• = 0 to each policy variable
(k ≥ 1) and each country. Ten parameters remain to be estimated: the country-specific
vacancy creation cost c0, the exogenous layoﬀ rate δ0, the two parameters of the matching
function (φ0, η), the leisure cost parameter z, the three parameters of the distribution of
worker heterogeneity (C, ν, µ), and the two parameters of the latent productivity process
(ρ, σ). The number of aggregate states is set to N = 150, the number of diﬀerent ability
types is taken equal to M = 500.
The business-cycle (BC) parameters θBC = (c0, δ0,φ0, η, z, C, ν, µ, ρ, σ) are estimated
using the Simulated Method of Moments, separately, country by country. In practice,
we simulate very long series at quarterly frequency (T = 5000 observations) of aggregate
output, unemployment rates, unemployment turnover and vacancies, and we search for
the set of parameters θBC that best matches the following 18 country-specific moments:
i) the mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation of log-GDP; ii) the mean, standard
deviation and kurtosis of log-unemployment;8 iii) the mean and the standard deviation
of logged job finding and job destruction rates, and market tightness; iv) four output
elasticities: unemployment, turnover rates and market tightness; v) the elasticities of the
job finding rate with respect to market tightness and unemployment rate.
Once these structural parameters are estimated, we filter out the series of aggregate
shocks yt so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals of log GDP. The parameters and
the series of aggregate shocks are then used to simulate the series of unemployment rates.
8Matching the kurtosis of time-series observations forces the simulated series to be smooth.
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4.2 Assessing policy eﬀects
In a second step, we introduce LMPs and we estimate all parameters, including the
response to LMP shocks, by iterating the following procedure:
1. Given parameters, filter aggregate shocks out by fitting aggregate output series
(detrended) by least squares, separately, country by country;
2. Given aggregate shocks, estimate parameters by fitting unemployment, turnover and
vacancy series (actual, not detrended) by simulated least squares, weighing residual
squares by the inverse variance of each series. Contrary to the first estimation, the
estimation of policy parameters is done jointly for all countries.
This estimation procedure is considerably easier to implement than any other method,
Bayesian or frequentist, for nonlinear state-space models.
The economy is simulated assuming myopic expectations on policy interventions.
Whenever a policy variable Xk is changed, which only happens infrequently, we recal-
culate the present values of unemployment and of match surplus for all aggregate states,9
together with the values of job finding and job destruction rate, and keep them set to
these levels until the next policy intervention.
We obtain standard errors for the estimates of LMP parameters as follows. Rather than
estimating the Jacobian matrix and using the “sandwich” formula, which is numerically
cumbersome and not very reliable given the amount of numerical simulations involved,
we instead note that equation (1) implies that
log ft − η log θt − log
(∑
m ut(m)ℓm1{St(m) ≥ 0}
ut
)
− logφ0 =
∑
k
φk•X
k
nt.
We then compute standard errors for the parameters φk• using the standard OLS formula
for the regression of the left-hand side variable on LMP regressors. This calculation
may severely overestimate the precision of the estimation by neglecting estimation errors
induced by using parameter estimates instead of true values to predict the left hand side.
9Note that the present values do not depend on parameters φ and c. The match surplus only changes
with δ.
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But it nevertheless provides useful information on how much the simulated series are
changed by a small perturbation of the policy parameters. We use a similar approach for
the other policy parameters based on equations (2) and (3).
5 The dynamics of cyclical unemployment
5.1 Parameter estimates
The results of the first-stage estimation are reported in Table 3. Productivity is more
volatile in European countries than in Australia and the US. Worker ability is less het-
erogeneous in Portugal and more heterogeneous in Germany and Japan. It follows that
the opportunity cost of employment z is also higher in Portugal and lower in Japan and
Germany; otherwise, it does not diﬀer much from 0.7, which is Hall and Milgrom’s (2008)
calibration for the US. It is diﬃcult to compare the estimates of the vacancy cost across
countries, as they use diﬀerent ways of measuring vacancies. They are also not compara-
ble with those estimated or calibrated in the other studies (e.g. 0.36 in Pissarides, 2009,
0.43 in Hall and Milgrom, 2008, 0.58 in Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008), which all use a
Mortensen-Pissarides model with a non-zero bargaining power for workers.10 Matching
eﬃciency (φ) is higher in Australia and Sweden and lower in France and Germany. The
rate of exogenous job destruction (δ) is higher in the United States, Australia and Spain,
and lower in Japan and Portugal. This inference is broadly in line with other micro and
macroeconomic evidence on job turnover rates (see Jolivet et al., 2006, Elsby et al., 2012,
Murtin et al., 2014).
Note that the elasticity of the matching function was arbitrarily fixed to 0.5 in all
country-level estimations. Indeed, we could fit all moments well for any preset value
of η. We explain this lack of identification as follows. The duration of unemployment
is controlled by three components: matching eﬃciency (φ), the meeting elasticity with
respect to market tightness (η) and worker employability (the sign of the match surplus).
10If firms have less bargaining power, their ex-ante profits are smaller; the free entry condition then
delivers the observed number of vacancies in equilibrium only if the unit cost of vacancy is also smaller.
The bargaining power of unemployed workers is assumed equal to zero mainly for analytical simplicity.
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Table 3: Estimates of Business Cycle Parameters
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA
Productivity (y)
ρ 0.970 0.938 0.933 0.942 0.842 0.972 0.961 0.970 0.959
σ 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.023 0.015
Worker Heterogeneity (x)
Minimum (C) 0.701 0.679 0.527 0.514 0.826 0.705 0.700 0.695 0.663
µ 3.658 4.624 3.288 2.126 5.691 4.625 4.039 4.417 3.859
ν 1.511 2.090 2.727 1.870 1.187 1.723 1.606 1.821 1.898
Mean (C + ν
µ+ν ) 0.993 0.990 0.980 0.982 0.999 0.976 0.984 0.987 0.993
Mode (C + ν−1
µ+ν−1) 0.824 0.870 0.871 0.804 0.858 0.840 0.830 0.852 0.852
Std ( µν(µ+ν)(µ+ν+1) ) 0.416 0.432 0.461 0.446 0.353 0.413 0.416 0.422 0.434
Unemployment benefit
z 0.716 0.716 0.683 0.565 0.834 0.745 0.728 0.721 0.693
Vacancy cost
c0 20.14 21.99 12.11 17.95 38.13 36.94 16.13 16.72 5.07
Matching function
Eﬃciency (φ0) 2.195 1.268 1.244 1.868 1.963 1.801 2.611 1.871 1.698
Elasticity (η) 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Job destruction rate
δ0 0.038 0.023 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.036 0.024 0.029 0.043
It seems that the latter two components are not separately identified. If one increases the
meeting frequency as a function of the number of created vacancies (η), one can cancel
that eﬀect by recalibrating the fraction of workers at risk of unemployability (i.e. by
putting more mass in the left tail of the ability distribution).
5.2 Fitting the cycle
Table 4 shows how the model fits the 18 moments used in estimation, Table 5 reports
the correlations between actual and simulated HP-filtered series, and Figure 3 plots the
actual and simulated unemployment cycles.
The fit is generally good (at least for such a simple model). In particular, the model
has no problem fitting both the volatility of output and the volatility of unemployment.
The mechanism is simple to understand. In good times, unemployment is low and stable
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Table 4: Fit of the Business Cycle Moments
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA
true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim.
Mean GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00
Std log GDP 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.023 0.026 0.017 0.018
Autocorr. log GDP 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.86 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98
Mean UNR 0.074 0.075 0.098 0.095 0.091 0.092 0.034 0.034 0.066 0.066 0.159 0.156 0.048 0.047 0.067 0.067 0.054 0.053
Std log UNR 0.125 0.124 0.087 0.085 0.118 0.117 0.141 0.138 0.187 0.191 0.191 0.190 0.366 0.310 0.174 0.161 0.144 0.126
Kurtosis log UNR 2.62 2.55 1.56 2.25 3.28 3.18 1.92 2.38 2.39 2.74 1.66 2.10 2.41 2.23 2.08 2.36 1.94 2.25
GDP elasticity of UNR -5.35 -6.15 -2.70 -3.61 -3.82 -4.46 -4.50 -4.55 -5.76 -4.68 -6.11 -6.26 -9.88 -9.14 -4.35 -5.78 -6.43 -6.67
GDP elasticity of JFR 5.42 6.44 5.55 4.28 3.47 5.73 3.10 4.80 3.58 4.95 4.97 7.41 4.33 9.12 3.14 6.01 3.13 6.96
GDP elasticity of JDR -1.81 -0.53 0.29 -0.45 -1.02 -0.51 -2.04 -0.30 -4.99 -3.37 -2.69 -0.58 -7.25 -1.02 -2.90 -0.51 -3.68 -0.29
GDP elasticity of tightness 17.56 9.15 4.59 5.61 11.73 6.00 8.92 5.57 11.58 6.40 8.32 10.40 23.32 11.63 12.89 8.64 12.22 9.21
Mean JFR 0.48 0.48 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.43 0.43 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.42 0.79 0.79
Std log JFR 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.31 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.13
Mean JDR 0.038 0.038 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.037 0.037 0.027 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.044 0.044
Std log JDR 0.066 0.027 0.085 0.035 0.078 0.075 0.098 0.039 0.201 0.200 0.110 0.054 0.264 0.081 0.135 0.037 0.098 0.018
Mean tightness 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.86 0.86
Std log tightness 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.15 0.28 0.17 0.40 0.22 0.48 0.30 0.77 0.38 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.17
Tightness elasticity of JFR 0.26 0.72 0.33 0.75 0.27 0.89 0.31 0.84 0.16 0.68 0.24 0.72 0.18 0.79 0.25 0.71 0.16 0.76
UNR elasticity of JFR -0.76 -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 -0.61 -1.07 -0.54 -0.98 -0.42 -0.72 -0.69 -1.12 -0.32 -0.95 -0.34 -1.00 -0.42 -1.01
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Table 5: Correlation Between Actual and Predicted Detrended Series
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average
Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.87 0.73 0.92 0.77 0.87 0.75 0.81
Job Finding Rate 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.31 0.85 0.82 0.70
Job Destruction Rate 0.16 0.03 0.32 0.02 -0.06 0.20 0.36 0.23 0.34 0.18
Market Tightness 0.71 0.63 0.38 0.51 0.83 0.84 0.43 0.67 0.65 0.63
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Figure 3: Unemployment Cycle - Actual (solid line) and Simulated (dotted)
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and all separations follow from exogenous shocks. When aggregate productivity falls,
low-skilled workers start losing their jobs because their match surplus becomes negative.
A thick left tail of the distribution of worker heterogeneity amplifies the recessive eﬀect
of negative productivity shocks. If the recession lasts, unemployment increases because
low-ability workers remain unemployed longer. When the economy recovers, previously
unproductive workers become productive again, and they progressively start to get back
to work. The process of layoﬀ and reemployment is dissymmetric: all unproductive
workers are immediately laid oﬀ, while all unemployed, yet productive workers are not
instantaneously reemployed.
The fit of job finding rates is also good, with accurate estimates of volatility. However,
the elasticity of job finding rates with respect to tightness (respectively to unemployment)
is greatly over-estimated (resp. under-estimated). Although the correlation between
actual and predicted series of tightness is good (around 65%), we generally greatly under-
estimate its volatility. These two findings (the excess sensitivity of the job finding rate to
market tightness and the under-estimation of the volatility of tightness) are related. The
response of vacancy creation to productivity shocks has to be attenuated, or job finding
rates would not be well fitted. Additional friction (such as the negative dependence of
job finding rates to unemployment duration) is therefore required to make the job finding
process more sluggish in recovery times.
Finally, the job destruction rate that is predicted by the model is too uneven or jagged,
and its correlation to actual series is poor. This may happen again because the process
of endogenous job destruction is too lumpy. Following a negative productivity shocks,
a mass of workers is instantly laid oﬀ, and the job destruction rate is immediately after
reverted to the frictional rate of exogenous job destruction unless aggregate productivity
keeps going further down.
We will see in the next section that this apparent failure at fitting some aspects of
turnover and vacancies could be an artifact of detrending (using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter). If total output is clearly trended and easily detrended, long-term trends in labor
market variables are much more diﬃcult to filter out. This is the reason why Shimer
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(2005), and his followers, including us, used the HP filter with a smoothing parameter
of 105, much greater than the standard value of 1024 recommended for quarterly series.
Using 1024 yields a trend of unemployment that undulates like a cycle. In the next section,
we will argue that a better way of handling trends in labor market variables is to model
them by way of intervention variables (policy or demographics).
6 The impact of labor market reforms
6.1 Parameter estimates
The estimated policy parameters are reported in Table 6. LMP variables are centered at
their country-specific mean and standardized by the cross-country and cross-time stan-
dard deviation of the LMP. Policy parameters are thus semi-elasticities that quantify the
relative increase in parameters φ, δ, c when LMPs are increased by one standard deviation
around the country-specific mean of the policy variable.
All the policy eﬀects have the expected sign (when precisely estimated). Large eﬀects
are recorded for ALMP-placement services and training on job destruction rates, which
we interpret as the result of improved matching technology. Employment incentives and
product market deregulation also have a strong and positive eﬀect on job creation. The
replacement rate, employment protection and the tax wedge also have significant eﬀects,
although of smaller magnitude (on φ, δ and c respectively). The bottom part of Table
6 reports the estimated eﬀects of education and demographic variables. Educational
achievement moderately reduces the pace of job destruction, as an additional 0.4-year of
higher education (one standard deviation) yields a 5.0% reduction in the job destruction
rate.11 As expected, older (more experienced) workers tend to remain unemployed longer,
but face a lower layoﬀ risk.
11For comparison, mean years of higher education have on average increased by 0.33 years over the
period 1985-2007.
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Table 6: Estimates of Policy Eﬀects
φ δ c
Initial replacement rate -0.028 0.029
(0.008) (0.009)
ALMP Placement and 0.032 -0.101
Employment Services (0.006) (0.007)
ALMP Training -0.038 -0.097
(0.016) (0.019)
ALMP Incentives 0.057 -0.161
(0.019) (0.059)
Product Market Regulation -0.025 0.111
(0.017) (0.062)
Employment Protection -0.043 0.037
(regular contracts) (0.008) (0.024)
Tax wedge 0.023 0.037
(0.008) (0.023)
Mean Years of -0.014 -0.051
Higher Education (0.008) (0.009)
Share 15-24 population 0.016 -0.011
(0.010) (0.011)
Share 55-64 population -0.017 -0.036
(0.006) (0.007)
6.2 Fitting the trends
Figures 4-7 show how good the model is at predicting labor market outcomes given pro-
ductivity shocks and institutional change. Table 7 displays the correlations between actual
and predicted series. Actual and simulated unemployment rates are highly correlated for
all countries, with an average correlation equal to 0.82. The best fit is obtained for Aus-
tralia, Japan, Sweden and the UK with correlations close to or above 0.90, while the
model performs less well for the US with a correlation of about 0.56.
The fit of job destruction rates is greatly improved by comparison to the cyclical
estimation, as the correlation between predicted and observed series jumps from 0.18 in
the BC-model to 0.56 in the LMP-model. The fit of job finding rates, which are well
predicted except for Germany and Portugal, and the US to a lesser extent, has also
improved. Market tightness is well fitted for all countries but the US and Portugal.
The only country for which the model fails the fit test is the US. It may be that by
estimating LMP eﬀects jointly we impose to the US labor market a European norm that
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does not apply to the US. It may also be that simulating the economy at the quarterly
frequency does not work well for the US, as very few workers remain unemployed longer
than a quarter. Yet, overall, these results suggest that LMPs help predict the permanent
shifts in unemployment and its turnover components well.
We finally ask whether the simulated series in Figures 4-7 reproduce the correlations
with LMP variables that can be obtained by regressing unemployment rates, layoﬀ rates,
job finding rates and vacancies or tightness on LMPs. Table 8 shows the regression on
actual data and on simulated series. In general the fit is good, showing that the three
channels of policy interventions match reasonably well the observable impact of these
policies on unemployment, layoﬀ, job finding, vacancies and tightness.12 We emphasize
again that a unique structural eﬀect of LMPs on parameters φ, δ and c is assumed for all
nine countries.
6.3 Assessing the Impact of Labor Market Policies
In order to get a sense of the marginal eﬀect of each policy on unemployment, we calculate
a “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences” (DiD) treatment eﬀect for each LMP separately and all to-
gether as follows. First we simulate for the period 1985-2007 the benchmark series of labor
market outcomes responding to the estimated series of aggregate productivity shocks and
to the observed series of LMP variables. Then we run counterfactual simulations with
the LMPs remaining fixed to their country-specific mean value. Finally, for each country,
we calculate DiD policy eﬀects as the benchmark mean unemployment change minus the
counterfactual mean change.
Table 9 reports the results. Placement services, UI initial replacement rate and prod-
uct market regulation are the main intervention channels by which countries significantly
influenced unemployment over the period, these by all means classical policies being ac-
countable for close to one, or more than one percentage point reduction or augmentation
of unemployment.13 The other policies yielded, on average, only between 20% and a third
12Note that the reduced forms conclude to a positive eﬀect of employment protection on unemployment,
the layoﬀ rate being reduced by more than the job finding rate is increased. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay
(2002) already made that conclusion.
13Yet the eﬀect of product market regulation on employment has not received much attention. See
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Table 7: Correlation Between Actual and Predicted Unfiltered Series
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average
Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment 0.96 0.79 0.67 0.97 0.75 0.81 0.98 0.89 0.56 0.82
Job Finding Rate 0.86 0.90 0.56 0.84 0.37 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.69 0.77
Job Destruction Rate 0.68 0.27 0.39 0.87 0.41 0.33 0.95 0.54 0.62 0.56
Market Tightness 0.94 0.90 0.71 0.81 0.58 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.14 0.76
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Figure 4: Unemployment
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Figure 5: Job Finding Rate
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Figure 6: Job Destruction Rate
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Figure 7: Market Tightness
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Table 8: Reduced-Form LMP Eﬀects on Employment - Actual and Simulated
Log UNR Log LDR Log JFR Log V Log Tightness
Observed Simulated Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul. Obs. Simul.
Initial Replacement Rate 0.064 0.054 0.030 -0.005 -0.037 -0.053 -0.065 -0.003 -0.133 -0.057
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.003)
ALMP: Placement -0.095 -0.119 -0.069 -0.112 0.020 0.005 -0.012 -0.046 0.080 0.073
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)
ALMP: Training -0.126 -0.104 -0.091 -0.077 -0.014 -0.029 -0.198 -0.049 -0.099 0.056
(0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.042) (0.005) (0.044) (0.006)
ALMP: Incentives 0.013 -0.010 0.034 0.053 0.063 0.099 0.326 0.208 0.341 0.217
(0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.044) (0.005) (0.046) (0.007)
Product Market Regulation 0.045 0.063 -0.016 -0.021 -0.076 -0.084 -0.167 -0.126 -0.199 -0.189
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.028) (0.003) (0.030) (0.004)
Employment Protection -0.047 -0.023 -0.078 -0.020 -0.042 0.008 -0.006 0.001 0.046 0.023
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)
Tax Wedge 0.082 0.027 0.037 -0.000 -0.051 -0.032 0.015 -0.056 -0.064 -0.083
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003)
Average Years of Higher Education -0.074 -0.036 -0.069 -0.044 0.003 -0.010 -0.030 -0.015 0.045 0.021
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.019) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003)
Demographic share of 15-24 population 0.023 -0.028 0.013 -0.018 0.003 0.017 0.024 -0.004 -0.014 0.025
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.027) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004)
Demographic share of 55-64 population 0.002 -0.028 0.010 -0.040 -0.011 -0.027 -0.011 -0.017 -0.022 0.011
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003)
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of a percentage point.
These average eﬀects hide a variety of interventions across countries, which we sum-
marize as follows. Australia and France increased expenditure on placement services and
deregulated product markets. Germany deregulated. Spain massively reduced unem-
ployment benefits, deregulated and reduced employment protection. The UK reduced
unemployment benefit, improved placement services and deregulated. The only countries
implementing unemployment-augmenting policies are countries with low unemployment
rates and hit by a deep and long-lasting recession at the end of the eighties or the be-
ginning of the nineties. Thus Japan and Sweden massively reduced ALMP expenditure.
Lastly, Portugal and the US made no noticeable classical policy intervention.
Note that the correlation with LMP changes is large but not always close to one, which
indicates that the model capture some nonlinearities that reduced forms tend to miss.
We also do not find evidence of much policy complementarity, as the sum of individual
eﬀects is similar in value to the DiD eﬀect of the policy mix. This finding contradicts
Bassanini and Duval (2009), who report positive interaction eﬀects on the basis of reduced-
form regressions. Finally, identical labor market reforms trigger unemployment responses
proportional (in magnitude) to the baseline unemployment value — high-unemployment
countries such as Spain or France witnessing larger unemployment reductions than the
other countries; and more intensive interventions yield proportionally bigger eﬀects (see
the correlations in the last column of Table 9).
Next we measure the relative contribution of LMPs and business cycle shocks to the
long term variance of unemployment. In general, both contribute to about half of the
total variance, with some exceptions: in Japan, business cycle shocks do not explain
much unemployment volatility, and in Portugal and the US labor market policies seem to
have little impact. The lower panel of Table 10 analyzes the contributions of each LMP
separately. These results confirm those reported in Table 9. For Australia, Japan and
the UK, the main and most eﬀective policies were placement services and product market
deregulation; in Germany and Sweden, it is a mix of all three ALMPs; in France product
Felbermayr, G. and J. Prat (2011) for a recent exception.
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Table 9: Assessing the Impact of Labor Market Reforms on Unemployment
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Mean Mean
absolute
DiD
Correlation
with mean
LMP
change
Unemployment Rate, Average Change (percentage point)
Actual -5.35 -2.15 -1.33 1.32 1.52 -12.16 1.94 -7.96 -2.62 -2.97
Simulated -3.55 -4.27 -2.46 2.75 -0.88 -15.90 1.86 -6.17 -1.19 -3.31
(Correlation between actual and simulated = 0.93)
“Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ” Policy Eﬀects (percentage point)
Initial replacement rate -0.21 0.52 0.10 0.57 0.67 -3.19 -1.47 -1.30 -0.58 -0.54 0.96 0.94
ALMP: Placement -1.60 -1.05 -0.31 3.50 -0.27 -1.70 1.19 -2.86 0.11 -0.33 1.40 -0.94
ALMP: Training 0.00 0.04 -0.36 0.04 -0.16 -0.85 1.42 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.36 -0.91
ALMP: Incentives -0.04 -0.14 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.41 0.94 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.20 -0.96
Product Market Regulation -0.61 -0.90 -1.23 -0.33 -0.65 -1.69 -0.51 -1.07 -0.18 -0.80 0.80 0.65
Employment Protection -0.23 -0.09 -0.20 0.00 0.31 1.85 0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.17 0.31 -0.89
Tax wedge 0.00 0.15 0.31 0.45 0.67 -0.64 0.32 -0.37 0.27 0.13 0.35 0.86
Sum of individual policy eﬀects -2.68 -1.48 -1.65 4.21 0.56 -6.62 1.91 -5.17 -0.26 -1.24 2.73
Policy mix (all reforms) -2.99 -1.95 -1.50 4.10 0.45 -5.65 2.30 -4.88 -0.30 -1.16 2.68
Notes: For each country we first simulate unemployment over the 1985-2007 period responding to all
observed LMP changes and estimated business cycle shocks. In a second step, we simulate the series of
unemployment after shutting down one LMP at a time (i.e. the LMP is frozen to its average value for
the whole period). The table shows the diﬀerence between the mean unemployment change across time
estimated in the first step and the mean unemployment change, LMP by LMP, estimated in the second
step.
market deregulation; and Spain reduced employment protection.
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Table 10: Share of Unemployment Variance Explained by Covariates
AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Mean Correlation
with std of
LMP
change
Pseudo-R2 of LMPs and
business cycle (= 1 - MSE)
0.78 0.62 0.47 0.78 0.49 0.65 0.88 0.75 0.37 0.61
Decomposition of
Pseudo-R2
Business cycle shocks 0.37 0.35 0.25 0.08 0.42 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.33
LMPs 0.42 0.26 0.21 0.70 0.08 0.36 0.44 0.46 -0.10 0.31
Pseudo-R2 of specific LMPs
Initial replacement rate 0.046 0.019 -0.002 -0.035 0.042 0.028 0.046 0.047 0.031 0.025 0.25
ALMP Placement 0.165 -0.024 0.088 0.432 0.022 0.019 0.152 0.195 0.028 0.119 0.48
ALMP Training -0.014 0.014 0.115 -0.004 -0.002 0.008 0.359 0.000 -0.020 0.051 0.95
ALMP Incentives 0.004 0.057 0.072 0.001 0.023 0.007 0.549 0.006 0.004 0.080 0.99
Product Market Regulation 0.062 0.185 0.093 0.088 -0.042 0.086 0.057 0.104 -0.007 0.070 0.39
Employment Protection 0.079 -0.015 -0.028 0.000 0.032 0.205 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.030 0.88
Tax wedge 0.045 0.033 0.080 -0.038 0.049 0.007 -0.002 0.019 -0.083 0.012 0.35
Notes: The simulations are the same as for Table 9. We calculate the mean squared error (MSE) of
the benchmark model (i.e. the sum of squared errors for all the series used to estimate the parameters,
unemployment, job finding and layoﬀ rates, and tightness) with all LMPs and business cycle shocks.
The pseudo-R2 is 1 - MSE. We calculate the contribution of business cycle shocks as 1 - MSE(LMP =
0), where MSE(LMP = 0) is the mean square error of the model with LMPs remaining fixed at their
country-specific means. The contribution of LMPs is calculated as MSE(LMP = 0) - MSE.
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7 Conclusion
We have proposed a dynamic stochastic search-matching model with worker heterogeneous
abilities and labor market policy interventions. Worker heterogeneity makes the eﬀect
of negative productivity shocks on unemployment highly non linear, and provides an
amplification mechanism solving the unemployment volatility puzzle. Policy interventions
shift structural parameters such as matching eﬃciency, exogenous job destruction and
vacancy cost, and have long term eﬀects on unemployment. For all 9 OECD countries
used in the analysis, the model displays an impressive fit of unemployment dynamics. The
amount of resources injected into placement and employment services, the reduction of UI
benefits and product market deregulation stand out as the most prominent policy levers
for unemployment reduction. All other LMPs have a significant but lesser impact. We also
find that business cycle shocks and LMPs explain about the same share of unemployment
volatility (except for Japan, Portugal and the US).
Our model fits labor outcome series well with the exception of the US. This seems to
indicate that European and US labor markets diﬀer in a fundamental way. It would be
interesting for future work to collect series at the state level and estimate a specific version
of the model for the US. It is thus likely that diﬀerent policies, or the same policies but
with diﬀerent elasticities, explain diﬀerent unemployment dynamics across US states.
Our model is both simple and flexible. Yet, in its present form, it remains too simple,
and not flexible enough to adequately capture all aspects of labor market institutions. For
example, an important operating mechanism is search intensity, which is not explicitly
modeled here (only through an exogenous change in matching eﬃciency). Moreover,
unemployment benefits are always paid for a fixed period of time, thus introducing state
dependence in search intensity. Another possible extension relates to labor market non
participation.
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COMPANION APPENDIX: 
LABOUR MARKET REFORMS AND UNEMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 
By Fabrice Murtin and Jean-Marc Robin 
 
This companion appendix provides further details on data construction and estimations not reported in 
the main paper. 
A1. Construction of unemployment flow data 
We collect data on unemployment flows from various sources, namely Robin (2011), Murtin, de Serres 
and Hijzen (2014), Eurostat (2011), OECD Employment Outlook (2010) and Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2008). Our constructed series are systematically compared with those by Elsby et al. (2013).  
Unemployment flow series are based on unemployment duration data, which exists only on an annual basis 
for most countries before the mid-1990s, and on a quarterly basis afterwards. We select quarterly data 
when they are available, otherwise we take annual data assuming constant flows within each year. Next 
figures show that, within each country, annual and quarterly series are always consistent with each other. 
Besides, unemployment duration data generally describe the stock of unemployed workers for several 
durations of unemployment, namely less than 1 month, less than 3 months, less than 6 months and less than 
one year. Instantaneous entry and exit rates from/to unemployment can be calculated using any of the latter 
durations as a benchmark. In some countries, the choice of a given duration matters as outflow rates vary 
with the time spent in unemployment: There is negative duration dependence or “hysteresis effects”. 
Following common practice applied in other studies (e.g. Elsby et al., 2013), one selects a benchmark 
duration of 1 month in countries that display duration dependence. This concerns Australia, Japan, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Then, quarterly probabilities are recovered from 
monthly series by using a probabilistic tree. For other countries with stable turnover rates and no duration 
dependence, quarterly series are used directly to minimize measurement errors.  
Finally, unemployment turnover is commonly described by two different types of series: Instantaneous 
hazard rates arising from a time-continuous framework, and entry and exit probabilities observed at a 
discrete frequency. We focus on the second type of variable and describe quarterly unemployment entry 
and exit probabilities. Our sources for flow data are the following: 
Australia:   We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1997 then OECD Employment Outlook 
(2010) quarterly series. 
! 2!
France: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 2003Q1 then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series. 
Germany: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 2005 then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series. 
Japan: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014). 
Portugal: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1998 then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series. 
Spain: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1998 then Eurostat (2011) quarterly series. 
Sweden: We use annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 2004, impose inflow and outflow rates equal 
to their corresponding 2004 values in 2005, then select Eurostat (2011) quarterly series from 2006Q1 
onwards. 
United Kingdom: We use quarterly series from Petronglo and Pissarides (2008) based on job claimants 
until 1987Q4, then annual series from Murtin et al. (2014) until 1999Q2 and finally Eurostat (2011) 
quarterly series. 
United States: We use Robin (2011) quarterly series. 
 
A2. Other series  
OECD (2011) database is used for the quarterly unemployment rate. Quarterly series of job vacancies are 
borrowed from OECD (2011), Eurostat (2011) and Robin (2011). 
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A3. Resulting series of unemployment turnover  
We display below the resulting turnover series for all countries and compare them with comparable series 
from other studies. 
!
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